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INFO AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 03315

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, UK, RH
SUBJECT: BRITAIN AND RHODESIA

SUMMARY: THE LABOR GOVERNMENT IS NOW APPRAISING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANGOLA AS THEY AFFECT SUBSTANTIAL BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE REST OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. ATTENTION IS ON RHODESIA WHICH MANY HERE BELIEVE IS AT THE EDGE OF WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE AND THE MOST LIKELY TARGET IN A CONTINUING COMMUNIST STRATEGY TO DOMINATE THE LOWER THIRD OF THE CONTINENT. THE DOMESTIC EFFECTS OF A CALAMITY IN RHODESIA WILL INVOLVE THIS GOVERNMENT IN A MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS, BUT IN THE END, WE CANNOT ENVISAGE BRITAIN ACTING MILITARILY IN RHODESIA OR TAKING ANY DRAMATIC STEPS TO REVERSE THE FLOW OF EVENTS THERE. END SUMMARY.

1. BRITAIN IS LOOKING DOWN THE DARK RHODESIAN TUNNEL WITH ONLY FLICKERS OF LIGHT AT THE OTHER END. A GOVERNMENT PREOCCUPIED BY ITS ENORMOUS INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES AND AT THE SAME TIME ATTEMPTING TO WORK OUT A REGIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS MUST NOW CONFRONT A PROBLEM HANDED DOWN FROM A BRIGHTER COLONIAL ERA IN A FAR AWAY CONTINENT. LIKE A HEADACHE, RHODESIA HAS THROBBED IN THE BACKGROUND OF SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS FOR MORE THAN A DECADE. INTERMITTENT ATTEMPTS AT A CURE HAVE FAILED. AND NOW RHODESIA THREATENS AGAIN TO INFLECT SHARP PAIN ON BRITISH POLITICS.

2. ONLY RECENTLY HAS THE LABOR GOVERNMENT FULLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE MOMENTUM OF EVENTS IN ANGOLA COULD SWEEP INTO OTHER PARTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND MAY BE ON THE CONFIDENTIAL

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VERGE OF DOING SO. THE 12,000-MAN CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA, THE MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPLIES, THE CAPABILITY OF THE TWO COMMUNIST POWERS TO MOUNT SUCH AN EFFORT, AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DO IT SO BOLDLY DID NOT UNTIL EARLY FEBRUARY SEEM TO THE BRITISH TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES BEYOND THE LOCAL ANGOLAN SCENE. THEN, WITH THE HALT OF AMERICAN AID, THE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH

AFRICAN FORCES, AND THE COLLAPSE OF UNITA'S RESISTENCE, ANGOLA SUDDENLY SEEMED TO BE LESS A CONTAINABLE CONFLICT AND MORE THE FIRST ACT IN A LONG, VIOLENT PLAY. IN FACT, THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE FIGHTING IN ANGOLA THE GOVERNMENT HERE WAS AN OBJECTIVE OBSERVER. IT INSISTED, PROBABLY RIGHTLY, THAT ANY EFFORT TO PRESSURE THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS TO WITHDRAW WOULD CERTAINLY FAIL UNLESS SOUTH AFRICA FIRST REMOVED ITS TROOPS. FROM THE BEGINNING, THE FOREIGN OFFICE BELIEVED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD GOTTEN THE RUSSIANS OFF THE HOOK. MOREOVER, BRITAIN DID NOT WISH TO TIE ANGOLA TO DETENTE. IN HIS PUBLIC ADDRESSES, FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN CRITICIZED SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA BUT DID NOT CONDEMN THEM AS JEOPARDIZING EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS EXTRAORDINARY EXAMPLE OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM MUST BE RESISTED IN THE INTERESTS OF DETENTE AND WESTERN SECURITY CONVINCED FEW HERE. THE CONCEPT SEEMED TOO GLOBAL, TOO RIGID, AND TOO UNAPPRECIATIVE OF THE LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND NUANCES OF AFRICAN POLITICS. THE GOVERNMENT ESTIMATED THAT ONCE THE FIGHTING STOPPED, AFRICAN NATIONALISM WOULD REASSERT ITSELF AND THE TYPICALLY CLUMSY SOVIETS WOULD SOON BE INVITED TO LEAVE. ALTHOUGH CONCERNED IN A GENERAL WAY ABOUT ANGOLA,

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BRITAIN ACTED IN A DETACHED ALMOST ACADEMIC MANNER. ITS
CITIZENS ND INVESTMENTS THERE WERE FEW, AND ITS LONG
AFRICAN EXPERIENCE ARGUED THAT ANGOLA WAS ESSENTIALLY AN
AFRICAN PROBLEM. IN ANY EVENT, BRITAIN ALREADY HAD
ENOUGH TROUBLE ON ITS HANDS AS IT WAS: ICELAND, NORTHERN
IRELAND, BELIXE, NOT TO MENTION ITS MORE ENDURING CON-
CERNS AT HOME AND IN EUROPE. BRITAIN'S DIRECT INVOLVE-
MENT IN ANGOLA WAS LITTLE AND UNHAPPY. THE UK BECAME THE
ONLY MAJOR COUNTRY TO CLOSE ITS CONSULATE IN LUANDA DUR-
ING THE JULY FIGHTING IN THE CITY, WHICH, WHILE PRUDENT,
SEEMED PREMATURE IN RETROSPECT. AND ITS LAST INVOLVEMENT
-- THE HAPHAZARD INTRODUCTION OF LARGELY BRITISH MERCEN-
ARIES TO RESCUE THE FNLA -- ENDED IN SQUALID TRAGEDY.
THE FOREIGN OFFICE FREQUENTLY MEASURES THE VIGOR OF OTHER

GOVERNMENTS OF A SPECTRUM RANGING FROM "ROBUST" TO "WET;"
IN ANGOLA, BRITAIN WAS DAMP.

3. WHATEVER THE MERITS OF THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT ANGOLA, WHITEHALL IS NOW DEEPLY TROUBLED ABOUT THE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA. THE CONCERN IS COMPOUNDED BY A SENSE OF HELPLESSNESS AND IMPOTENCE AS WELL AS A VAGUE, UNEASY FEELING THAT EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL UNFOLD AT A PACE FASTER THAN THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO REACT. THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THE SMITH-NKOMO TALKS ARE ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE AND THAT PUTTING TOGETHER ANY OTHER ALTERNATIVE FORUM FOR NEGOTIATIONS IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE. SMITH, THEY BELIEVE, IS INTRANSIGENT. LIKE A SMALL BOAT IN A HIGH SEA, HE WILL TRY ANY TACK, ANY MANEUVER TO KEEP AFLOAT. OBSERVERS HERE, LOOKING AT THE INCONSEQUENTIAL RESULTS OF LORD GREENHILL'S LONG-SHOT MISSION TO SALISBURY, HAVE CONCLUDED THAT DESPITE THE LOOMING PROBABILITY OF WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE IN RHODESIA, SMITH WILL NOT COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF MAJORITY RULE. HE IS PLAYING FOR TIME, BUT CALCULATES THAT THE CONSIDERABLE ODDS AGAINST HIM ARE ACCEPTABLE. SMITH BELIEVES THAT WHEN PUSH COMES TO SHOVE -- ESPECIALLY IF CUBANS ARE DOING THE PUSHING -- THEN SOMEONE WILL BAIL HIM OUT: PERHAPS THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF THE COMMUNIST THREAT, OR PERHAPS THE UNITED KINGDOM BECAUSE OF ITS "KITH AND KIN," OR PERHAPS THE SOUTH AFRICANS FOR BOTH REASONS. SMITH IS CONVINCED THAT HIS SECURITY FORCES CAN HANDLE A BLACK NATIONALIST GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, AND THAT IF THE NATIONALISTS ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY OUTSIDE POWERS, THEN HE WILL BE ALSO. HIS GAME NOW IS TO GAIN TIME -- STRING OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, TALK TO THE BRITISH, CONFUSE THE ISSUES -- IN THE BELIEF THAT SOUTH AFRICA AT LEAST WILL ARRIVE AT THE CONCLUSION THAT ITS SURVIVAL IS DEEPLY ENTWINED IN RHODESIA'S. IF VORSTER, REFLECTING ON ANGOLA, IS PERSUADED THAT SOUTH AFRICA STANDS ALONE, IAN SMITH DOES NOT BELIEVE THE SAME IS TRUE OF RHODESIA.

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BILITY OF WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE IN RHODESIA, SMITH WILL NOT COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF MAJORITY RULE. HE IS PLAYING FOR TIME, BUT CALCULATES THAT THE CONSIDERABLE ODDS AGAINST HIM ARE ACCEPTABLE. SMITH BELIEVES THAT WHEN PUSH COMES TO SHOVE -- ESPECIALLY IF CUBANS ARE DOING THE PUSHING -- THEN SOMEONE WILL BAIL HIM OUT: PERHAPS THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF THE COMMUNIST THREAT, OR PERHAPS THE UNITED KINGDOM BECAUSE OF ITS "KITH AND KIN," OR PERHAPS THE SOUTH AFRICANS FOR BOTH REASONS. SMITH IS CONVINCED THAT HIS SECURITY FORCES CAN HANDLE A BLACK NATIONALIST GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, AND THAT IF THE NATIONALISTS ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY OUTSIDE POWERS, THEN HE WILL BE ALSO. HIS GAME NOW IS TO GAIN TIME -- STRING OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, TALK TO THE BRITISH, CONFUSE THE ISSUES -- IN THE BELIEF THAT SOUTH AFRICA AT LEAST WILL ARRIVE AT THE CONCLUSION THAT ITS SURVIVAL IS DEEPLY ENTWINED IN RHODESIA'S. IF VORSTER, REFLECTING ON ANGOLA, IS PERSUADED THAT SOUTH AFRICA STANDS ALONE, IAN SMITH DOES NOT BELIEVE THE SAME IS TRUE OF RHODESIA.

4. WHITEHALL IS UNCERTAIN HOW IMMINENT THE THREAT TO RHODESIA IS. THEY ESTIMATE THERE ARE SOME 1,700 WELL TRAINED GUERRILLAS NOW AVAILABLE FOR AN ATTACK AND THAT SEVERAL NATIONALIST UNITS ARE ALREADY OPERATING INSIDE RHODESIA. OFFICIALS HERE GUESS THERE ARE AN ADDITIONAL TWELVE OR THIRTEEN THOUSAND VOLUNTEERS NOW COLLECTED IN FOUR CAMPS INSIDE MOZAMBIQUE. THESE HAVE NOT BEEN TRAINED, HOWEVER, AND REPORTS INDICATE THAT MORALE, ORGANIZATION, AND LEADERSHIP IN THE CAMPS ARE AT A POOR LEVEL. IT IS SCARCELY AN ARMY ON THE MOVE AND PREPARATIONS COULD TAKE A LONG TIME. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS NO SIGN THAT

EITHER KENNETH KAUNDA OR SAMORA MACHEL IS WILLING TO MAKE HIS COUNTRY AVAILABLE FOR SIGNIFICANT SOVIET/CUBAN ACTIVITIES. THERE HAVE BEEN STORIES OF CUBAN ADVISERS IN MOZAMBIQUE AND SOVIET TANKS OFF-LOADING AT BEIRA, BUT THESE ARE SO FAR UNEVALUATED. REPORTEDLY, MACHEL IS NOW PREPARED TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON RHODESIA, MUCH TO THE SACRIFICE OF HIS OWN COUNTRY'S ECONOMY, AND RHODESIAN "HOT PURSUIT" INTO MOZAMBIQUE COULD PROVIDE MACHEL WITH A JUSTIFICATION TO LOOK FOR EXTERNAL AID. BUT FOR THE MOMENT, THIS IS STILL SPECULATION. MOREOVER, THE MILI-CONFIDENTIAL

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TARY IMPLICATIONS OF ANGOLA MAY NOT APPLY AT ALL IN RHODESIA BECAUSE CHINESE INTENTIONS ARE AT THIS STAGE UNCLEAR. ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE CLEVERLY SLIPPED OUT THE BACK DOOR IN ANGOLA, THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO SUSPECT THEY WOULD DO THE SAME IN A RHODESIAN CONFRONTATION. CHINA HAS LONG BEEN A PATRON OF NYERERE AND MACHEL AS WELL AS OF THE RHODESIAN GUERRILLAS. TO STAND BY IDLY AND PERMIT THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS TO TAKE OVER DIRECTION OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND WIN ALL THE LAURELS WOULD BE UNCHARACTERISTIC OF THE CHINESE AND UNLIKELY IN THE SINO-SOVIET CONTEXT.

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5. IF THE TIMING OF INCREASED VIOLENCE IN RHODESIA IS
UNCERTAIN, ITQ INEVITABILITY IS NOT. AMONG OTHER EFFECTS
ANGOLA ENHANCED THE ACCEPTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY OF VIO-
LENCE IN THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT. LEADERS SUCH AS
KAUNDA, WHO HAVE ALL ALONG PRESSED FOR A PEACEFUL SOLU-
TION IN RHODESIA, WILL FIND THEIR LINE LESS CONVINCING.
ANGOLA ALSO BLURRED THE IMAGE OF SOUTH AFRICAN AND MER-
CENARY INVINCIBILITY. FINALLY, ANGOLA SEEMED TO DEMON-

STRATE THAT THE WEST WILL NOT INVOLVE ITSELF MILITARILY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. RHODESIA THEREFORE APPEARS RIPE FOR THE PICKING. IN ANGOLA, THE CONFLICT WAS BLACK AGAINST BLACK AND EACH FACTION DREW SOME SORT OF SUPPORT; BUT NO MATTER WHO IS INVOLVED IN RHODESIA, A FIGHT AGAINST AN ILLEGAL, RACIST, MINORITY REGIME IN SALISBURY IS ON PERFECT POLITICAL GROUND. THERE WILL BE NO SPLIT IN THE OAU THIS TIME. AND IF THE WEST WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT TO A BLACK NATIONALIST GROUP IN ANGOLA, IT WOULD FIND IT POLITICALLY UNJUSTIFIABLE, EVEN FOR THE SAKE OF DETENTE, TO DO MORE FOR WHITES IN SALISBURY.

6. HOWEVER EVENTS DEVELOP IN RHODESIA, BRITAIN CANNOT BE A DETACHED OBSERVER. THE KITH AND KIN ARGUMENT IS A REAL ONE HERE. BY AND LARGE RHODESIANS ARE NOT THE DESCENDENTS OF EMIGRANTS FROM LONG AGO BUT THE BROTHERS OR CHILDREN OR NIECES OR COUSINS OF MANY BRITISH CITIZENS. AS VIOLENCE GROWS IN RHODESIA, THE EMOTIONAL STRAIN HERE WILL ALSO INCREASE, AND MPS WILL COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM MANY OF THEIR CONSTITUENTS. MOREOVER, BRITAIN CONTINUES TO HOLD CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR RHODESIA, AND AS MEANINGLESS AS THAT CONCEPT HAS BEEN, IT COULD TAKE ON

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MORE FORCE SHOULD CUBAN SOLDIERS AND RUSSIAN TANKS CROSS THE BORDERS OF WHAT IS LEGALLY REGARDED AS A BRITISH COLONY. AND BRITISH INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA, WOULD SEEM IMPERILED BY A RHODESIAN CALAMITY THAT COULD THREATEN TO SPREAD SOUTH. FINALLY, THE SPECTACLE OF A POSSIBLE COMMUNIST DOMINATION IN ALL OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, WITH ITS STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS, WOULD LEND CONSIDERABLY MORE WEIGHT TO THE SAME DETENTE ARGUMENT THAT FELL ON DEAF EARS HERE DURING THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT. WARNINGS HAVE ALREADY BEEN VOICED BY THE RIGHT-WING OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY (AMERY, CRITCHLEY, AND CHURCHILL), BUT THE COMBINATION OF ALL THE FACTORS ABOVE -- KITH AND KIN, RESIDUAL CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ECONOMIC DISTRESS, AND STRATEGIC CONCERN -- COULD GIVE A MUCH BROADER BASE TO A PUBLIC OUTCRY AND TO THE DEMAND THAT BRITAIN DO SOMETHING.

7. THE GOVERNMENT SEES FEW ALTERNATIVES AS THE GLOOMY RHODESIAN PICTURE COMES INTO FOCUS:

8. A) THE CHANCES OF A PEACEFUL CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT ARE REMOTE. EVEN A DRAMATIC REVERSAL OF SMITH'S ATTITUDE ON MAJORITY RULE WOULD LEAVE THE QUESTIONS OF TIMING AND COMPENSATION AND MYRIAD OTHER PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION. MILLIONS OF POUNDS TO SUBSIDIZE THE EXIT OF WHITE SETTLERS FROM RHODESIA WOULD BE HARD FOR THE FINANCIALLY

STRAPPED LABOR GOVERNMENT TO JUSTIFY, PARTICULARLY AS IT JUST ANNOUNCED SUBSTANTIAL CUTS IN PUBLIC SPENDING ON SOCIAL PROGRAMS IN BRITAIN. STILL, THE UK WOULD PROBABLY PAY ANY PRICE TO AVERT DISASTER IN RHODESIA. BUT IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT SMITH AND NKOMO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION AND THAT THE MODALITIES OF THE TRANSITION CAN BE WORKED OUT, THE SETTLEMENT WOULD STILL HAVE TO BE SOLD TO THE FOUR PRESIDENTS AND TO THE INCREASINGLY MILITANT GUERRILLAS NOW GEARING UP FOR A FIGHT. THE MISFORTUNE IS THAT THE TIME FOR ANY PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT MAY HAVE ALREADY PASSED.

9. B) SOUTH AFRICA IN THE END MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY THE PRESSURES ON THE RHODESIAN REGIME INCLUDING THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS. OBSERVERS HERE
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BELIEVE THAT ONLY VORSTER HOLDS THE LEVERS THAT CAN CONVINCE SMITH TO COME TO TERMS. BUT THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT VORSTER IS WILLING TO USE THEM, AND IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS THE SOUTH AFRICAN HAS SPECIFICALLY RULED OUT THIS COURSE. SIR ANTHONY DUFF, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE, WHO SECRETLY VISITED VORSTER TWO WEEKS AGO, RETURNED FROM HIS MISSION TO CAPE TOWN AND DESCRIBED VORSTER'S MOOD AS "APOCALYPTICAL." BRITAIN WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HOPE THAT, ONCE THE ANGOLAN DUST HAS SETTLED, VORSTER WILL SEE THAT SMITH IS DRAGGING SOUTH AFRICA IN A DIRECTION AWAY FROM WHERE ITS REAL IN-

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TERESTS LIE. TO PERMIT RHODESIA TO DEGENERATE INTO A SIT
UATION OF VIOLENCE IN WHICH THE NATIONALISTS INVITE
FOREIGN INTERVENTION WILL BE PRECISELY THE SITUATION
SOUTH AFRICA MOST WANTS TO AVOID. MAYBE VORSTER WILL SEE

THE LIGHT IN TIME, WHITEHALL HOPES.

10. C) AS THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE INCREASES IN RHODESIA SO TOO MIGHT THE PROSPECTS FOR A PUTSCH THAT WOULD REMOVE SMITH FROM OFFICE. THE RHODESIAN MILITARY APPARENTLY IS LESS CONVINCED OF ITS ABILITIES THAN SMITH AND LESS SANGUINE THAT GUERRILLA OPERATIONS ALONG RHODESIA'S MEANDERING FRONTIERS CAN BE ADEQUATELY CONTAINED. AS CASUALTIES MOUNT, THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES COULD BE MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE ARGUMENT THAT SMITH IS LEADING THE COUNTRY DOWN A DISASTROUS ROAD. A PROLONGED GUERRILLA WAR WOULD ALSO SEVERELY STRAIN THE RHODESIAN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY AS MORE AND MORE MEN ARE CALLED AWAY FROM THEIR JOBS TO TAKE UP ARMS. AT SOME POINT IN THIS SCENARIO, THE MAJORITY OF WHITES WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THEY HAVE MORE TO LOSE IN FIGHTING THAN IN GIVING UP. IF SMITH IS REMOVED BY SOME FORM OF COUP BEFORE THE VIOLENCE IS ENTIRELY OUT OF HAND, THEN BRITAIN MIGHT INTRODUCE ITS OWN TROOPS TO ESTABLISH ORDER AND SUPERVISE AN IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF POWER. BUT THIS IS ALL A MATTER OF FINE TIMING.

11. D) IF RHODESIA DESCENDS INTO A NIGHTMARE OF BLOODSHED, THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE LABOR GOVERNMENT HERE WOULD INTERVENE MILITARILY. CALLAGHAN HAS UNEQUIVOCALLY TOLD SMITH THAT HE MUST GO IT ALONE, AND THERE IS NO REASON TO DOUBT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY. RECONFIDENTIAL

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REGARDLESS OF THE ANNOUNCED PURPOSES OF A BRITISH INTERVENTION, IT WOULD BE SEEN IN AFRICAN EYES AS AN EFFORT TO RESCUE RHODESIA'S WHITE COMMUNITY. EVEN WITH EVIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT CUBAN OR SOVIET OR CHINESE SUPPORT FOR THE NATIONALISTS, THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER IT FOLLY TO COMMIT FORCES TO RHODESIA AND THEREBY JEOPARDIZE ITS INTERESTS IN THE REST OF BLACK AFRICA AND POSSIBLY INVOLVE ITSELF WITH ADVERSARIES IT IS NOT WILLING TO TAKE ON. IF TEN YEARS AGO HMG REFUSED TO DISPATCH TROOPS TO SUPPRESS THE WHITE REBELLION, THEN IT COULD SCARCELY JUSTIFY NOW A MILITARY MOVE TO PREVENT THE OVERTHROW OF THAT SAME REBELLIOUS REGIME. THE CLAMOR FROM THE CENTER AND LEFT OF THE LABOR PARTY OVER SUCH A MANEUVER WOULD BE ENOUGH TO RING THE BELLS OF BIG BEN. THERE IS A SLENDER POSSIBILITY THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD SEND TROOPS SOON TO REMOVE SMITH AND IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT, BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY, AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HERE THAT THIS GOVERNMENT HAS THE STOMACH FOR SUCH A RISKY AND CONTROVERSIAL MOVE.

12. E) OTHER THAN CONTINUED AND POSSIBLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

TIVE PRESSURE ON VORSTER, LONDON SEES LITTLE IT CAN DO TO STAY THE GRADUAL DISINTEGRATION OF THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA. THE RESIGNATION IN WHITEHALL IS PERVASIVE AND THOUGHTS NOW ARE SLOWLY TURNING TO THE ONE ALTERNATIVE THAT CAN BE ENVISAGED: EVACUATION. SHOULD THE SECURITY POSITION OF THE WHITE RHODESIAN COMMUNITY BECOME DESPERATE, HMG WOULD PLAN TO ORGANIZE A MASS EVACUATION EFFORT. WHILE MOST WHITE RESIDENTS WOULD DEPART BY LAND INTO SOUTH AFRICA MR BOTSWANA, OTHERS COULD REQUIRE A WAY OUT BY AIR. DEPENDING ON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OPERATION, BRITAIN MIGHT CALL ON US FOR ASSISTANCE.

13. OUR CONCLUSIONS ARE THAT THE RHODESIAN DRAMA MAY UNFOLD MORE SLOWLY THAN MANY NOW ANTICIPATE AND THAT A SIMPLE REPETITION OF ANGOLA IS TOO FACILE A SCENARIO. BUT WHATEVER THE COURSE OF EVENTS, WE CANNOT ENVISAGE BRITAIN INTERVENING MILITARILY IN RHODESIA NO MATTER HOW GREAT THE THREAT NOR HOW COSTLY THE CONSEQUENCES. ALTHOUGH BRITAIN'S INTERESTS ARE DIRECTLY AFFECTED IN RHODESIA AND THE DOMESTIC REPERCUSSIONS OF A CRISIS WILL
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BE SUBSTANTIAL, THE LABOR GOVERNMENT SEES LITTLE IT CAN DO AND WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT LEADERSHIP FROM LONDON.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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